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"[T]heories about 'what corporations are,"' writes Professor David
Millon, "influence thinking about how the law should treat corporate
activity.", What, then, are corporations? Millon, reviewing the history of
how corporations have been understood in America since the nineteenth
century, outlines three areas of definitional contention: (1) the corporation
as an entity versus the corporation as simply the aggregate of its particular
parts; (2) the corporation as an artificial creation of state legislation versus
the corporation as a natural product of human activity; and (3) the cor-
poration as a private body versus the corporation as a public entity charged
with public .duties.
Because there has never been agreement in this country over what
corporations are, skepticism over any assertion that they must-by nature,
the laws of God, tradition, or the dynamics of -organizational activity-be
any one thing is appropriate. Even if the nature of corporations has always
been contested, the range of disagreement is not quite as broad as Professor
Millon argues. His three categories are all, to one degree or another,
reducible to the private body/public entity distinction. To speak of the
corporation as an entity or an aggregate is simply another way of asking
whether it is public or private. By dividing the corporation into its units,
proponents of the aggregate view are making a claim that such units act as
individuals and therefore ought to be treated as private agents. Proponents
of the entity theory argue that large-scale organizations, precisely because
they take on a life of their own, are charged witi public functions. Similarly,
the debate over the artificiality or naturalness of the corporation is also a
debate over the private and the public. If the corporation is created by a
state legislature, it has a public origin and therefore can be regulated by
the state, but if a corporation is the natural product of individuals, it
remains private. In other words, while there will always be debate on what
the corporation is, that debate, for a considerable period of time, has
revolved around one fundamental issue: is the corporation private or public?
If this is the key question, it is also an awkward question. A number
of contemporary intellectual developments, most prominently the rise of
feminist theory, have brought into question the whole notion that one can
* University Professor and Professor of Sociology and Political Science, Boston Uni-
versity.
1. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DuKE L.J. 201, 241.
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make a distinction between the public and the private. 2 Concerned that the
public/private distinction reinforces the powerlessness of women by con-
signing domestic work to the presumably less valued "private" sector,
feminists have shown that families serve public functions and assume public
responsibilities. Given this type of criticism, it is not surprising that some
writers find the public/private distinction increasingly obsolete, one more
nail in the intellectual bankruptcy of contemporary liberalism.3 Recognizing
such criticism, Professor Millon insists that his use of the public/private
distinction is not based on the notion that the distinction is valuable; it is
instead a reflection of how the distinction has been used in legitimating the
corporation.
4
Yet Millon is not quite accurate, for he not only uses the public/private
distinction, he celebrates it. In his comments on Chancellor Allen's decision
in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Millon points out that
"[r]ead generously, Time implies that all corporate law must take into
account its public dimension, and thus corporate law is public law." 5 If
Millon is somewhat ambivalent about whether the public/private distinction
should be criticized or used, he is not alone. Many feminists who question
the public/private distinction nonetheless are willing to use it to defend the
right to abortion, for example, which, significantly enough, has been based
not on the notion of women's equality, but rather on the notion of a
generalized right to privacy. 6 In similar fashion, AIDS activists argue for a
stronger public commitment to AIDS research and treatment, even while
claiming that legislatures and judges should respect the privacy associated
with sexual conduct.7 Those who question the public/private distinction in
one context complain when the Supreme Court, as in Bowers v. Hardwick,
fails to recognize the very distinction they criticize.'
In pointing out that those who are critical of the public/private dis-
tinction nonetheless use it, my intention is not to find inconsistency or
hypocrisy. Instead, I hope to suggest that, for all its problems, the distinction
2. For contrasting examples, see JEAN B. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN:
WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND PoLrrTcAL THOUGHT (1981) and CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SExuAL CON-
TRACT (1988).
3. Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REv. 1349 (1982).
4. Millon, supra note 1, at 202.
5. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Millon,.supra note 1, at 261; see also Lyman Johnson
& David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAW. 2105 (1990).
6. Not all feminists are happy with the right to privacy approach. It has been criticized
by Catharine MacKinnon on the grounds that privacy reinforces conceptions of the bourgeois
family and women's role within it, as well as on the grounds that a right to privacy makes it
more difficult to pursue those who commit violence against women. Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991).
7. For a passionate defense of the right to privacy on cultural issues, see H. N. HIRSCH,
A THEORY OF LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTION AND MINORITIES (1992).
8. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). I elaborate on these points in greater
detail in Whose Body Politic?, AM. PROSPECT, Winter 1993, at 99.
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between public and private touches on essential issues that cannot be ignored.
This distinction is especially important in the context of debates over what
corporations are. If we believe that corporations are private agents, they
are free to mind their own business outside the purview of the rest of
society. They are obligated only to themselves, although presumably they
may choose to extend that obligation to others. In addition, they are rights-
bearing creatures protected by the same clauses in the Constitution that
protect individuals, most significantly, the right to free speech. If, on the
other hand, corporations are understood as public actors, all these conclu-
sions are reversed. Corporations have obligations not only to their share-
holders, but also to others in the society as well; they have public duties,
even to the point of having to accept lower profits than might otherwise
be the case. And, of course, the actions of those who make decisions in
their name are subject to public review and scrutiny, and could be reversed
if found insufficient by standards premised on a notion of the common
good.
Precisely because the terms public and private describe so much, a great
deal can be gained by claiming the turfs they identify. Certainly corporations
themselves have historically chosen to adopt the private vision of this duality
as their self-understanding. Due process of law and contractual understand-
ings of obligations facilitated this self-conception, recently aided by the law
and economics movement and other approaches rooted in neoclassical or
microeconomic theory. Although situations of combined economic stagna-
tion and international economic integration would seem to make the question
of the public role of the corporation more salient than ever, a good deal
of contemporary economic and legal theory attempts to define the corpo-
ration as little more than a large bunch of private actions lumped together.
On the other side of the distinction, reformers and critics of the
contemporary corporation emphasize the public side of the equation. This
emphasis has existed since the New Deal, even though the postwar period
has not been characterized by major advances in public theories of corporate
activity. Indeed Berle and Means' book, first published in 1932, is still one
of the most frequently cited works on corporate governance among reform-
ers. 9 Since the hostile take-overs and leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) of the
1980s, some have detected a new turn toward the public aspects of corporate
governance with the passage of "directors' duties" statutes by a majority
of the states. These statutes suggest that directors may look "beyond
shareholders" in deciding how to act.'0 While disagreeing about everything
9. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDNER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PIVAT PROPERTY (rev. ed., Harcourt Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932). There has been no
great classic since this work, with the possible exception of Chandler's The Visible Hand,
which is not really about corporate governance in any direct sense. ALFRED D. CHANDLER,
JR., THE Visin.E HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REvOLUTION IN AMERICAN BusuNass (1977).
10. Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes,
61 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 14 (1992).
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else, James Hanks and David Millon agree that such laws may have radical
consequences for how we define the corporation."
In this Article I will use the debate that has grown out of efforts to
redefine the constituencies of the corporation as well as the academic theories
that underlie the debate to address the issue of the public/private distinction
and its relevance for corporate law. Like many other contemporary writers,
I will find flaws in the public/private distinction. In particular, I will argue
that both sides in these controversies have problems determining where to
draw the boundary between these realms, although the kinds of problems
they have differ. The economic theorists of the firm solve the problem by
drawing the line as close to the private side as possible. In so doing, I will
argue, they distort the true nature of a corporation. As their theories
become divorced from reality and instead become normative pleas for what
a corporation should be, they need to justify drawing the line where they
do. They have been unable, however, to develop a convincing justification.
This is in part because their notions of privacy differ so greatly from those
generally associated with the liberal tradition.
On the other side of the distinction, the problem is reversed. Advocates
for greater public responsibilities of corporations do not have a clear and
precise place in which to draw the boundary between public and private.
Consequently, their notions lack principled consistency and vary depending
on whose interests they are trying to protect. Although this may make for
inconsistent law, such ambiguity makes sociological sense because it recog-
nizes that, in reality, corporations combine elements of both private and
public responsibility. Given that both approaches are flawed, I will conclude
that the flaws of inconsistency are far less serious than those of unreality.
Therefore, any efforts to rethink corporate law should begin with the public
side and move toward the private rather than the other way around.
II. Tim FiRm AS IT IS OR THE FRm As IT OUGHT TO BE
The discipline of economics, and to some degree the academic study of
the law, has been trying to determine what a corporation is. One answer
to this question is especially intriguing, for its implications are quite revo-
lutionary. This answer, developed from Ronald Coase's seminal article on
the theory of the firm, states that a corporation is an umbrella that enables
private parties to contract with each other more efficiently by limiting the
costs of the transactions between them.'2 As interpreted by some of its
advocates, the importance of this theory is that it rejects as metaphysical,
as well as empirically false, the notion that corporations are legal entities
brought into being by state action. Some advocates for this point of view
11. James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholders Constituency Statues in
the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REv. 97 (1991); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND.
L. REv. 223 (1991).
12. Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNoMcA 386 (1937).
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claim that states do little more than register private decisions already made
by private parties. '
3
This perspective emphasizes that anything done by a corporation could
be done by individuals without the corporate structure, but the costs of
their cooperation would be enormous.' 4 Firms, therefore, are functionally
similar to markets, but organizationally different. They are shells-"a legal
fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which various
individuals have voluntarily entered into for mutual benefit," 5 as one writer
puts it-that permit a division of labor to take place with relatively minimal
friction. In particular, corporations make it possible for those who have
money, but little managerial ability, to enter into contracts with those who
have managerial skills but little money. If neither party to the contract
believed that the contract was working-if the shareholders were dissatisfied
with management or if management ignored the interests of the share-
holders-the contract would fall apart. The fact that the corporation exists
is proof that the contract is mutually beneficial.
Although corporations facilitate routinized private transactions, costs
still remain. The potential for free riding exists in any cooperative venture.
Shirking, opportunism, and other attempts to gain benefits without paying
costs will be common. In addition, managers monitor the production
process, but someone has to monitor the monitors. Those who view the
corporation as a nexus of private contracts have thought long and hard
about all these problems. Some of them argue that hierarchy develops inside
the corporation as a way of constraining opportunism.' 6 Others point to
the disciplining effects of external markets, such as the market for managers
themselves or the stock market, which allow shareholders to remove their
funds from one firm and invest them in another.' 7 The many constraints
and checks on the parties to the contract generated by mutual advantage
minimalize the need for government regulation. The recognition of fiduciary
duties-the responsibility of directors and managers to care about the firm
and remain loyal to the interests of the stockholders-is the only necessary
13. Robert Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property
View, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327 (1979).
14. The key works that launched this perspective are Armen A. Alchian & Harold
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv.
777 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); and Eugene
F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 327
(1983).
15. Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259,
1273 (1982).
16. The costs of opportunism and shirking have been particularly stressed by those who
take a neo-institutionalist view of the firm as a bundle of contracts, especially Oliver William-
son. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, Tm ECONOMC INsTrruTIONs oF CAPrrIusM: Ftuis,
MARK*ETs, AND RELATI YAL CONmRACrmo (1985).
17. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965).
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regulation.' 8 Therefore, much of corporate law is unnecessary, if not harm-
ful. 19
In the absence of any challenge to Berle and Means' 1932 work from
a reform perspective, the nexus of contracts approach has become the most
theoretically sophisticated way of answering the question of what managers
and shareholders owe each other. There will inevitably be conflicts between
managers and shareholders, this perspective acknowledges, but this does not
necessarily constitute a problem-certainly not a problem that ought to be
solved by greater shareholder democracy or external regulation. Shareholders
are seen best not as the actual "owners" of the firm-no one can own
legal fictions-but rather as the "residual claimants" who have the right to
leftover income after the firm concludes its business. Residual claimants sell
their willingness to take risks. Therefore, it is not necessary for them to
know the activities of the managers. They can, in other words, remain
"rationally ignorant" of management activities as long as managers give
them adequate returns on their investments. Managers, in turn, are the
agents of the shareholders, tied to them by mutual interest in making a
profit. Whatever conflicts that might develop between shareholders and
managers usually can be controlled by limiting the costs of their agency
relationship. While managers migit be tempted to ignore shareholder's
interests-for example, by accepting a lower offer for the firm by an outside
purchaser-this will happen rarely in reality. Internal and external markets
constrain both parties. Consequently, the problems identified by Berle and
Means-especially the problem of the separation between ownership and
control-are really nonexistent problems.
Thinking about the corporation as a nexus of contracts is the latest
version of a historical tradition emphasizing laissez-faire. Indeed, in some
versions, the conclusion that government should not intervene in private
economic life is the accepted fact and the intellectual analysis follows.
20
Because it is so closely associated with laissez-faire, the nexus of contracts
approach leans toward the private side of the public/private distinction;
private actors ought to be given the benefit of all doubts. Both the defenders
and the critics of this approach understand it as individualistic in inclination.
"The contractual theory views the corporation as founded in private con-
tract," writes Henry Butler.2' Similarly, William Bratton, who is critical of
this trend, points out that this approach "is merely the latest in a long
series of attempts to describe and justify the phenomenon of collective
production in individualist terms."
' 22
18. Kenneth E. Scott, Corporate Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Gov-
ernance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983).
19. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
288 (1980); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 14.
20. This seems particularly true of Fischel, supra note 15.
21. Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, GEO. MASON U. L.
REV. 100 (1989).
22. William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1472-73 (1989).
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Because this approach seems so relentlessly private and individualistic,
it should provide a straightforward mechanism for deciding where the line
between private and public ought to be drawn: as close to the former, and
as far away from the latter, as possible. One of the attractive features of
this theory is that it makes the task of boundary drawing so simple. But
this approach sacrifices something to gain this clarity. One question always
seems to arise in dealing with the way economic theorists of the firm have
influenced corporate law: is the notion of the corporation as a nexus of
contracts an empirical description of the world as it is or a normative
prescription of the world as it ought to be? If our answer to this question
is the former, then drawing the boundary close to the private poses no
problems because one need only find the line that already exists. But if the
nexus of contracts theory of the firm is normative, then drawing the line
close to the private at least raises one significant problem: by what justifi-
cation should the line be drawn there and nowhere else?
Those writing within the tradition of the economic theory of the firm
undoubtedly think of themselves as realists who are describing people as
they actually are. This theory does not posit, as some versions of the
invisible hand do, any "natural" harmony of interests that will emerge out
of the single-minded pursuit of self-interest. The vision of human nature
associated with theorists in this tradition is anything but Rousseauian. Terms
such as "opportunism" or "shirking" are meant to be an acknowledgement
of a theory that understands human beings in Hobbesian terms. The concept
of the person as these writers understand it seems explicitly counter-utopian.
Moreover, the economic theory of the firm is not premised on any kind
of technological or functional utopianism in which all the parts will be
smoothly integrated into a well-functioning whole. At first glance, the
division of labor as these writers understand it seems to share much in
common with early Durkheimian functionalism: managers with skill meet
investors with money and the result is harmony.u But just as Emile
Durkheim turned away from pure functionalism to symbols, the collective
conscience, and, ultimately, the mind as a way of understanding what holds
human beings together in groups, the economic theorists of the firm do
not, finally, rely on pure functionalism either. For them, either strong
authority or some conception of obedience to rules insures that the oppor-
tunities for free-riding and other forms of contract breaking will not get
out of hand.
Finally, writers in this tradition strive, if anything, for a kind of hyper-
realism when describing situations of possible moral ambiguity. A good
deal of the rhetorical power of their writing comes from the shock value
of defending unpopular positions, such as justifying the huge debt accu-
mulated in the wake of LBOs or dismissing the concerns of workers and
the local community when firms move or go out of existence. This kind of
hyper-realism is illustrated by Daniel Fischel, who urges that we always
23. EbL DuRKim,, THE DIVISION oF LABOR IN SociErY (George Simpson trans., 1933).
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keep in mind "the fundamental distinction between conduct that is detri-
mental to investors-theft, for example-and conduct that may be morally
objectionable to some but beneficial to investors." 24 Among the latter are
such things as corrupt practices, environmental degradation, and criminal
acts. Leaving aside for the moment whether these practices are only detri-
mental to some-crime is usually understood to harm the entire society,
not just the immediate victims-Fischel goes on to state that the existence
of such criminal conduct' actually demonstrates why the economic theory
of the firm is empirically realistic:
If anything, the widespread practice of these alleged "abuses"
proves precisely the opposite proposition from that stressed in the
[Securities and Exchange Commission on Corporate Accountability]
Report-that managers are in the main fully dedicated to the goal
of maximizing shareholders' wealth, and no regulative intervention
in this regard is needed. 2
Words such as these, which come fairly close to outright justification of
criminal conduct, would seem to clinch the case that a Machiavellian realism
pervades the economic theory of the firm.
Yet what a strange realism this is. After all, large corporations are
composed of people who speak many different languages, have never met
each other, work in positions defined by different degrees of power and
responsibility, and have wildly different motives, loyalties, and talents. Can
contracts exist between people who never meet, have nothing in common,
and are unavailable to pass judgment on the behavior of the other parties
to the contract? Perhaps they can in a metaphorical sense, in roughly the
same way that early social contract theorists understood the body politic to
operate. But no one ever claimed that the social contract was an empirical
description of actual real-world events. In the liberal tradition-up to and
especially including John Rawls-the social contract has been a thought
experiment designed to answer "what if" questions, not "what is" ques-
tions.
Even as a metaphor, however, the notion of the firm as a nexus of
contracts has problems. Again a comparison to Durkheim may be in order.
The real question for Durkheim was not, as it is for the economic theorists
of the firm, who monitors the monitors. It was the prior question, first
posed by David Hume to the early social contract theorists, of what contract
makes it possible to have contracts. 26 Answering that question became
Durkheim's life-long quest, for he was convinced that he would never
understand society as it actually exists without understanding what held the
moral order together. Because economic theorists do not ask this question,
24. Fischel, supra note 15, at 1267.
25. Id.
26. DAvID HuME, Of the Original Contract, in EssAys: MoRAL, POLrrIcAL, AND LrERARY
443 (T. H. Greene & T. H. Grose eds., 1907).
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but merely assume that contracts can be enforced without understanding
the larger language, culture, mores, and traditions of the firms within which
the contracts exist, the economic theory of the firm does not readily qualify
as an empirical description of real firms in the real world. The theory is
not quite as realistic as its practitioners suggest.
Indeed, in many ways, the economic theory of the firm, while seeking
a form of hyper-realism in some areas, becomes quite idealistic in others.
Bratton has argued that the economic theory of the firm would have
remained obscure were it not for the merger mania of the 1980s, which
suddenly made the question of the duties of directors and shareholders
front-page news.27 The same development illustrates why the theory fails as
a description of reality, because real-world politicians, as well as the general
public, responded to the LBOs by questioning the absolute right of directors
to further the self-interest of shareholders with no other questions asked.
Indeed, it was not just legislators who began to argue that directors had
larger duties; directors-at companies such as MacDonald's, Control Data,
One Bancorp, and GTE-did so themselves. 28 Since efforts to broaden the
duties of directors beyond the shareholders are as much real world phenom-
ena as crime or blackmail, why did they happen?
Economic theorists are never at a loss to answer a question like this.
Public choice theory readily explains legislation guiding directors' duties by
arguing that the directors of firms facing hostile takeovers act as an interest
group to have such legislation passed and in that way are demonstrating
the power of self-interest. 29 Such a theory does not explain why directors
themselves might consider duties beyond those owed to shareholders, but
presumably the economic theorists can develop an explanation based on
rational choice to account for that situation as well. There is something
unsatisfying about these explanations; since one can always find an inter-
pretation that will support a self-interested explanation, it should not be
surprising that, as an explanation of such things as directors' duties statutes,
these efforts are, in Eric Orts' words, "empirically incorrect." 30 But that is
not my point in discussing the matter in this context. Rather, I want to
emphasize the way in which acts that are seemingly disinterested or altruistic
cause economic theorists of the firm to shift their arguments in significant
ways.
The ordinary explanation of such events is that just as some people
sometimes engage in corrupt practices, other people at other times-or even
the same people at other times-engage in altruistic and responsible ones.
The one practice is as real as the other. Comfortable in one aspect of the
real world and uncomfortable in another, however, economic theories waiver
27. Bratton, supra note 22, at 1474.
28. Orts, supra note 10, at 20 n.27.
29. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLuM. L. Rav. 223 (1986); Roberta Romano,
The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. Rav. 111 (1987).
30. Orts, supra note 10, at 78.
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back and forth from a hyper-realistic posture when it comes to the less
attractive features of human conduct and a counter-factual posture when it
comes to the more attractive ones. The notion that what seems to be
altruism is really self-interest is a way of arguing that what seems to be
real is not really real at all-hardly a position compatible with taking the
world as it is. Under these conditions, we are told to look behind the veil,
to consider alternative theories, to discount what appears to be the case-
all rhetorical styles that are as common to Marxism as they are to microe-
conomic theorists. Presented with a real world fact-state legislators really
did pass laws potentially broadening director's duties-this approach re-
sponds by reinterpreting such reality out of existence through the suggestion
that such efforts "may represent rent-seeking efforts, not altruistic attempts
at remedying existing wrongs."'"
In its counter-realistic guise, the economic theory of the firm can be
understood as addressing a Ulysses-at-the-mast problem.32 Tempted by the
siren call of immortality or simply the recognition that comes from doing
good, or acting as obedient citizens when legislators pass laws telling them
of their obligations, both directors and shareholders require a mechanism
that will tie them to the mast of mutual self-interest even when they are
otherwise inclined to defect. That mechanism is the economic theory of the
firm. It exists, and it obtains its power, because so long as it is in place,
real people will have an ex post facto justification for going against their
good will and sense of community belonging. At the moment, the economic
theory of the firm is experiencing great strength in legal circles.33 It is the
only well-developed theory of corporate governance in existence, far stronger
in its intellectual appeal and internal logic than anything proposed by those
who would regulate corporate activity in the public interest.
But if the theory of corporate governance is strong, one of the reasons
is that, in the real world, public efforts to regulate corporations are also
strong. The economic concept of the firm is reactive in the sense that it
requires real world behavior to run contrary to the theory in order for the
.theory to gain adherents. Putting the matter another way, if corporations
were so self-evidently little more than a nexus of contracts, there would be
no need for a vigorous group of academic thinkers to assert that they were;
it is because the theory makes so little sense to state legislators and ordinary
people affected by corporate decisions that we have the theory in the first
place.
However realistic and empirically descriptive the economic theory of
the firm may be about firms themselves-as ought to be clear, the theory
is not especially empirically adequate-it is rather unrealistic when it comes
31. Roger Dennis & Dennis R. Hornabach, Corporate Governance Theory in the 1990s,
44 RUTGERS L. REv. 533 (1992).
32. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY
(1979).
33. See Dennis Honabach & Roger Dennis, The Seventh Circuit and the Market for
Corporate Control, 65 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 681 (1989).
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to explaining the political environment within which efforts to regulate firms
take place. Because the external environment, however, makes the economic
theory of the firm attractive, the economic theory of the firm is incapable
of explaining what gives rise to the economic theory of the firm. A theory
that can explain everything but itself would still not be a realistic theory.
The economic theory of the firm is not an empirical science because it
explains its own subject-the firm itself-poorly and the external environ-
ment not at all.
If the economic theory of the firm is not a realistic science, it is also
not a utopian prescription. The economic theory of the firm shifts from an
explanation of the world to a description of a counter-factual disutopia.
On the one hand, the theory claims that individuals are never accountable
for their actions. On the other hand, it anticipates that individuals will want
to take responsibility for their actions, necessitating a justification for
informing them that they would be wrong to do so. Because it has this
ambiguous relationship to reality, the economic theory of the firm cannot
be understood as simply an effort to describe the world as it is. Moreover,
the hypothetical aspects of the theory become more important precisely in
those periods in which the theory itself becomes more important. If,
therefore, the economic theory of the firm is a normative description of a
different set of social arrangements than the ones that currently exist, it
must include some justification, in terms of human improvement, for the
changes that will result from its adoption.
III. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PRIVATE
The process of drawing the line between private and public is neither
natural nor automatic. The line is drawn differently in different times and
different places, and law, including corporate law, is one of the major
mechanisms by which it is drawn. One of the great traditions in the West
has involved the development of the justification for expanding the private
realm, even if at the expense of the public. Liberal thinkers liked the notion
of privacy, and considered themselves individualists, for a reason. Individ-
ualism and privacy were important because they enabled people to become
autonomous and moral agents, responsible for their own fate.
John Locke, who argued for the sanctity of private property, was a
deeply religious thinker as well as one of the founders of modern psychology.
These intellectual interests led him to a concern not only for the protection
of the individual against government, but also for the moral and intellectual
capacities of the individual. 4 The great thinkers of the Scottish Enlighten-
ment were similarly preoccupied not only with liberty, but with the moral
conditions that made liberty possible. 5 Similarly, Immanuel Kant viewed
34. See JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN HIsToRICAL ACCOUNT
OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE "Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT" (1969).
35. See WEALTH AND VIRTUE: THE SHAPiNG OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE SCOTTISH
ENLIGHTENMENT (Istvan Hont & Michael Ignatieff eds., 1983).
1993] 1683
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1673
human beings as moral agents capable of taking responsibility for their
acts.16 Perhaps John Stuart Mill made the clearest link between liberal
theory and a certain conception of the person:
If we ask ourselves on what causes and conditions good govern-
ment in all its senses, from the humblest to the most exalted,
depends, we find that the principal of them, the one which tran-
scends all others, is the qualities of the human beings composing
the society over which government is exercised..,.
Government consists of acts done by human beings; and if the
agents ... are responsible, or the lookers-on whose opinion ought
to influence and check all these, are mere masses of ignorance,
stupidity, and baleful prejudice, every operation of government will
go wrong; while, in proportion as the men rise above this standard,
so will the government improve in quality .... 37
In short, the liberal suspicion of government was rooted in the idea that
something was fundamentally wrong with paternalistic and feudal tendencies
of government to assume responsibility for individuals. People needed to
develop their capacities to choose and to make decisions, for, in exercising
those capacities, they would develop their own sense of personal responsi-
bility.
By contrast, little sense of personal responsibility exists in the theory
of the corporation as a nexus of contracts. The intellectual effort behind
the theory has emphasized not the freedom individuals will have to act, but
rather the constraints they will be placed under by the contracts that bind
them. This emphasis is especially prevalent in the work of neo-institution-
alists such as Oliver Williamson, who tends to be more concerned with real
world corporations and how they actually work than are some of the model
builders who are more purely contractarian in their approach.3" From
Williamson's perspective, hierarchy and, at least within the firm, some
strong form of authority, is a recognized need. Corporations may be free
to act in external markets, but internally they are anything but free. Indeed,
their internal structure seems to resemble that of the government that writers
from this perspective generally fear. The corporation, as Max Weber wrote
of the state, becomes the place where legitimate power is concentrated for
collective ends. Thus, in Williamson's view, the individuals who populate
firms are not engaged in any process of maturation and self-development
that will enable them to take responsibility for the consequences of their
actions. They are, rather, egos on the loose, always tempted to reach short-
term solutions, which requires that a firm hand be exercised over them. Far
from responsible agents, responsibility will be taken for them.
36. See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1959).
37. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 37-39 (Curran
V. Shields ed., 1958).
38. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 16.
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Pure contractarian theorists, who emphasize the voluntary rather than
constraining features of interaction, surprisingly, allow for even less sense
of personal responsibility for decision. The image of the persons who enter
into contracts is more important than whether the contracts are voluntary
or forced. Such persons are not understood to be agents who develop their
human capacities through learning and experience; "rationally ignorant"
people are still ignorant. The economic theory of the firm assumes whatever
plausibility it may have by "dumbing down" the parties that constitute the
firm. It presumes that expectations of reward act to determine the choices
people will make. In fact, such people do not actually make decisions; the
economic advantages or disadvantages of their actions make the decisions
for them. It is as if expectations of gain are a kind of thermostat; trip the
meter one way and one kind of decision is made, trip it another and another
is made. The people involved in this process give up their responsibility to
the economic calculus. All such people therefore become indistinguishable
from one another; if one person for any reason fails to act properly, another
one will take his or her place. Such individuals may be persons, but they
are not responsible selves in the way many liberal theorists imagined human
beings.
The contrast between early liberalism and contemporary microeconomic
theory can perhaps be put this way: early liberals viewed the market,
individualism, and voluntary choice as empowering mechanisms that would
strengthen people's character. Contemporary economic writers view indivi-
duals as empowering the market to work in more efficient and productive
ways, even at the risk of disempowering the capacities of the people who
act in the market. F. A. Hayek, one of the intellectual originators of this
approach, conveyed some sense of this disempowerment. As Hayek stated:
So long as management has the one overriding duty of administering
the resources under its control as trustees for the shareholders and
for their benefit, its hands are largely tied; and it will have no
arbitrary power to benefit this or that particular interest. But once
the management of a big enterprise is regarded as not only entitled
but even obliged to consider in its decisions whatever is regarded
as the public or social interest, or to support good causes and
generally to act for the public benefit, it gains indeed an uncon-
trollable power-a power which could not long be left in the hands
of private managers but would inevitably be made the subject of
increasing public control.3 9
What Hayek does not say is that if managers are not permitted to take
their social responsibilities into account-if the only thing that can guide
them is their economic relationship with shareholders-then they are rela-
tively powerless human beings. They follow rules that they have no capacity
to alter. Whatever the economic advantages that may come to them, the
39. 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, LIBERTY 82 (1979).
.19931 1685
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1673
psychological advantages are minimal. They face no moral dilemmas, Kohl-
bergian or otherwise. 40 If chimpanzees could be trained to count, they would
be just as good, if not better, managers than human beings.
The economic theory of the firm implies that individuals are monads
who lack responsibility for their actions. They cannot take credit for correct
judgments or take responsibility for incorrect judgments. Moreover, this
lack of responsibility is not just a byproduct of the theory but one of its
central components. Writers in this tradition go out of their way to establish
that neither corporations themselves nor the people who constitute them
can be thought of as having moral responsibilities. As Daniel Fischel writes:
Those who argue that corporations have a social responsibility and,
therefore, that managers have the right, and perhaps the duty, to
consider the impact of their decisions on the public interest, assume
that corporations are capable of having social or moral obligations.
This is a fundamental error .... Since it is a legal fiction, a
corporation is incapable of having social or moral obligations, much
in the same way that inanimate objects are incapable of having
these obligations. Only people can have moral obligations or social
responsibility .... 4
In this passage the corporation is redefined as an "inanimate object"
no different than a rock. But of course the corporation is different from a
rock, for, even under Fischel's own account, it is a nexus of contracts
between people. Even more oddly, Fischel states that "only" people can
have social responsibility, as if a corporation had nothing to do with people.
But while this may be true in the abstract, it is not true that people within
the firm can have social responsibility, for writers in this tradition are
insistent that actors within a firm have obligations defined only by profit
maximization, -not by general moral or social responsibilities. Fischel thus
indirectly suggests an alternative definition of the firm; a firm is a device
through which human beings, who have moral obligations, come together
for the purpose of ridding themselves of their capacity to exercise moral
obligations. The corporation, according to the economic theory of the firm,
is a mechanism of responsibility displacement. This displacement of respon-
sibility that characterizes the economic theory of the firm is accomplished
in two steps. First, responsibility is taken from people and placed instead
in either the hierarchical authority or the transactions that take place between
people. Second, the institutional structures that come into being as a result
of this displacement of responsibility are then stripped of responsibility by
calling them legal fictions or artifacts. When the entire process is complete,
the modern corporation is defined as a self-perpetuating system in which
everyone follows a predetermined set of rules that results in the economic
betterment of all.
40. LAWRENCE KOHLBERO, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981).
41. Fischel, supra note 15, at 1223.
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If this conclusion is correct, then the basis of the individualism and
respect for privacy sought by writers in this tradition stands in sharp contrast
not only to liberal political theory, but also to other efforts to justify
privacy. The reasoning behind some versions of the right to abortion, for
example, assigns a priority to privacy not only as an end in itself, but also
because privacy will further the ability of an individual to grow into a
responsible human being. This reasoning surfaces in the Supreme Court's
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, which, in striking down laws regulating
the ability of married individuals to choose birth control for use in their
own bedrooms, replaced a feudal legacy of intervention in people's lives
with the eighteenth and nineteenth century notion of individual responsibility
for individual conduct.42 Roe v. Wade also touched on this theme by giving
women the right to control their own bodies in the first trimester of
pregnancy, 43 even though Roe, by some feminist accounts, did not go far
enough. Robin West, for example, wrote that
Women need the freedom to make reproductive decisions not merely
to vindicate a right to be left alone but often to strengthen their
ties to others: to plan responsibly and have a family for which they
can provide, to pursue professional or work commitments made to
the outside world, or to continue supporting their families or
communities."
These considerations, which touch on the kinds of moral dilemmas explored
by Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan-dilemmas that cannot even arise
in the Hayekian view of liberty-imagine the person in a very different way
than does the economic theory of the firm. 45
By contrasting the way privacy is treated in the economic theory of the
firm literature against the way it is conceptualized in other areas, two
sharply different visions of liberty emerge. One kind of privacy, constructs
people; the other deconstructs them. One envisions growth and development;
the other envisions automatic, preprogrammed responses. One includes an
incentive to learn, which is why free speech has aspects of a private right;
the other is indifferent in the face of ignorance. The literature spawned by
the economic theory of the firm clearly is individualistic, but what is more
important is the kind of individuals it envisions. These individuals are not
people as most of liberal political theory has always understood them.
The economic theory of the firm would suffer no infirmity if real life
individuals were as psychologically and cognitively "thin" as the theory
posits, because science has no other obligation than to describe the world
it finds. But because the economic theory of the firm is normative-because
42. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. Robin West, Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARv. L. REv. 43, 84-85 (1990).
45. For an exploration of some of these moral dilemmas, see RONALD DwoRcNm, LUE's
DOMInION: AN AGUMEN ABOUT ABORTION, EUNASIA, AND INDiviDUAL FREEDOM 30-67
(1993).
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it recognizes that human beings are in fact richly complex in their motiva-
tions, and therefore require a theory that tells them not to pay attention to
their own complexity-it must justify its prior commitments to the value of
privacy. Classical liberalism contained such a powerful justification. But
the economic theory of the firm is handicapped by its own limited views
of human beings. Unlike explicitly reformist theories, which argue that as
a result of some action currently not taking place in the real world, people
will be morally improved, this theory says that we need to change the world
to make people more morally impoverished. If that statement is the justi-
fication for priority of the private sphere, it is, unlike the justification
contained in liberal political theory, a very weak one.
Although the economic theory of the firm precisely draws the line
between private and public, the theory pays two prices for this clarity, and
either of these make adoption of that boundary very expensive. First, the
theory requires that individuals be less than they are capable of being. More
importantly, however, this judgment is made arbitrarily, representing little
more than the values of those who argue that human beings ought to be
less than they can be. Were we to conclude that firms should be seen as
nothing more than a nexus of individuals seeking to maximize their self-
interests, we would have drawn the boundary between private and public
in an arbitrary fashion based on little more than what some rather idiosyn-
cratic writers think, even though most people, including most historical
liberal theorists, think otherwise. This ground seems extremely unpromising
as a basis upon which completely to revise the way we conceive corporations
in the modern world.
IV. THE BouNDAiEs oF Tmi PuiLmc
Because the LBO and hostile take-over mania of the 1980s seemed to
put at risk any number of constituents of the corporation other than
directors and shareholders, including workers, suppliers, and members of
the local community, any theory that seems to exclude such additional
constituents from the relevant decisionmakers is bound to appear unfair.
As a result, even though the take-over mania has subsided, efforts to rethink
what a corporation is in ways that would include new constituents have
also arisen in recent years.
Unlike the nexus of contracts approach, advocates of the public re-
sponsibility of the corporation have no developed theory to which they can
turn. Compared to the sense of certainty with which the economic theory
of the firm draws the public/private line in legal questions, advocates for
the public point of view tend to be uncertain and tentative, as if they realize
that this line can never be drawn in any one place. This uncertainty puts
them at a rhetorical disadvantage, but it also may provide a realistic
advantage in dealing with corporations as they actually are.
For example, those who speak for the public side of the public/private
distinction seem more ad hoc-and more defensive-in their arguments.
Even those who advocate drawing the line to be more inclusive of the public
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concede much to the private view of the corporation. For one thing, no
one challenges the notion that no matter how the public/private line is
drawn in the future, directors of companies, in their private capacities, will
always exercise the most important role in corporate governance. Professor
Bratton, who is critical of the notion of the corporation as a nexus of
contracts, writes that "[c]orporate law is not an entirely 'private' proposi-
tion," but then adds "even though it tends to lie on the private side of the
broader continuum of public and private law." 46 Similarly, Professor Mitch-
ell does not argue that a tradition of public law ought to replace private
law in dealing with the modern corporation. Rather, his point is that "re-
emerging public law aspects of corporate law can be reconciled with the
private law model of directorial management, permitting us to retain both
the efficiency aspects of the latter approach and the legitimacy and fairness
functions of the former." 47 Private law, with respect to the corporation, is
clearly here to stay. In contrast to advocates of the nexus of contracts
approach, who view themselves as self-proclaimed revolutionaries, defenders
of public law are quite circumspect in their claims.
This sense of caution also emerges when we consider the ways in which
advocates of greater responsibility consider specific reforms. Professor Mar-
leen O'Connor, for example, writes that "[t]he scope and content of the
directors' fiduciary duties could be redefined to require directors to defend
the employees' interests during fundamental corporate changes. '48 Not only
does this formulation recognize the decisionmaking responsibilities of direc-
tors, it also restricts limits on their autonomy to periods of significant
corporate turbulence. Presumably at more normal times, more normal
governance will remain in place. When contemplating the parameters of
those extraordinary duties, O'Connor does not venture far: "At a minimum,
... any corporation that closes a plant or orders a mass dismissal should
pay severance benefits according to the employee's years of service and
should continue health care insurance for a period of time. ' 49 One may
consider such proposals radical in .the sense that American corporate leaders
currently do not have such duties. One could imagine, however, other
governance regimes in which corporate leaders would be happy to pay so
low a price to escape any other kinds of obligations they might face.
Perhaps this caution stems from the uncertainties of drawing a new line
between private and public, compared to the certainties of keeping an
existing line in place. If we change that line, the result may not only be
greater corporate accountability and responsibility, but also new difficulties
associated with establishing a new boundary. The most important of these
46. William W. Bratton, Public Values and Corporate Fiduciary Law, 44 RuToEas L.
Rav. 675, 696 (1992).
47. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Cor-
porate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REv. 579, 584 (1992).
48. Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Rec-
ognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. Ray. 1189, 1252 (1991).
49. Id. at 1254.
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difficulties is determining which new groups ought to be represented at the
corporate governance table. There are two ways to approach this problem.
One approach is to draw the new line conservatively, admitting just one or
two new parties to the table. The other approach is to draw it expansively,
admitting many new members to the table. Each approach presents its own
difficult issues.
If we adopt the conservative approach, then which new constituents of
the corporation should we admit? Those most affected by corporate deci-
sionmaking seem to have the greatest claim. If this is the primary criterion,
no other group has as strong a claim as those who work for a particular
company, especially those who have worked there for a long time. Certainly
the proposals made by writers such as Marleen O'Connor and Katherine
Stone for including workers in any discussions of corporate responsibility
are powerful ones. 50 They do entail at least one major risk: labor can be
as much a self-interested actor as any other participant in corporate gov-
ernance. Including labor as a relevant party may broaden somewhat the
social bargain contemplated by the corporation, but it also may leave the
present model completely in place. The line between public and private, in
other words, would not necessarily be redrawn if labor were included,
assuming that labor is just one more private party to the contract.
This may explain why some writers who argue on behalf of labor as a
party to the corporate contract do not object to the nexus of contracts
approach-as long as labor is included as one of the parties to the contract.
Generally, critics of the nexus of contracts approach have great respedt for
what they are criticizing. Professor Millon, for example, speaks of this
approach as a "novel and sophisticated" version of the aggregate theory
of the corporation. 5' But Professor Stone goes well beyond such rhetorical
recognition. She writes that "new theories of the corporation give a much
more rich and complex picture of the interests of corporate actors, which
advocate a broader view of corporate governance. '5 2 This criticism is
particularly true of Oliver Williamson's version of the theory. Stone states,
"Williamson's model of corporate governance, in which governance roles
are determined by the types of investments and safeguards of each constit-
uency, can illuminate these new developments in labor participation, and
can help us reconceptualize a new role for labor in corporate decision
making." 3 Indeed, Stone adds that under this theory, "labor stands formally
on an equal footing with all other contenders for power within the con-
cern."
5 4
50. Id.; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension
Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59
U. Cm. L. REv. 575, 641 (1992).
51. Millon, supra note 1, at 231.
52. Stone, supra note 50, at 641.
53. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Concep-
tions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 73, 161 (1988).
54. Id. at 152.
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This is an odd reading of the nexus of contracts approach, a good deal
of which" is devoted to demonstrating that residual claimants, not labor,
play the major role as parties to the corporate contract. 5 Certainly Professor
O'Connor finds the nexus of contracts approach hostile to labor, which
plays only a transitory role in most of these theories.-6 But if O'Connor's
interpretation is more faithful to the nexus of contract literature's intentions,
Stone still makes an important point, even if indirectly. There is no reason
why labor could not become an important player as corporations restructure.
But that role would not necessarily be one in which labor would stand for
a larger public interest. The equation of labor with the larger public-a
legacy of the Marxian notion that workers speak for the universal-is, in
watered down form, the legacy of the New Deal approach to collective
bargaining, an approach toward which Professor Stone is increasingly
critical.57 By her way of thinking, labor can be reconceptualized as an
interest group, one more claimant for scarce goods, and it can operate by
the same rules of self-interest under which all other interest groups operate.
It seems, then, that if we draw the new line between public and private
narrowly so as to include labor, we gain, as we do with the economic
theory of the firm, the advantage of definitional clarity; we know who the
parties to the bargain are. At the same time, however, we sacrifice the very
reason for wanting to redraw the line in the first place, which is to expand
the definition of public responsibilities. By reconceptualizing labor as one
more interest group, we also reconceptualize it out of the public domain.
The alternative method would be to draw the line between public and
private in a new place entirely. This method would have the advantage of
raising fundamental questions about corporate governance. It would stim-
ulate a larger debate on public responsibility and raise major issues of
ethical obligation. A redrawn line would please sociologists, theologians,
advocates of greater corporate responsibility, and some politicians. But
where, exactly, should this new line be drawn? That is not an easy question
to answer.
An extreme case illustrates some of the difficulties involved. Joseph
Singer, in trying to establish a claim for property rights in the job, argues
as follows:
Rather than asking "who owns the factory?", we should ask "what
relationships should we nurture"? We should encourage people to
rely on relationships of mutual dependence by making it possible
for everyone to form such relationships and by protecting those
who are most vulnerable when those relationships end. 8
55. This is especially true of Alchian and Demnetz.
56. O'Connor, supra note 48, at 1204.
57. Stone, supra note 50.
58. Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. Rav. 611, 751
(1988).
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Many questions exist about the kinds of relationships we ought to nurture,
but it is by no means clear that the realm of corporate governance is one
place in which such questions should be posed. Such questions-proper for
the realm of the family or the realm of the church-are inappropriate for
the realm of the economy. Unless we recognize different spheres of activity,
each with its own code of ethical or moral behavior, we solve the demar-
cation problem between private and public by including everything within
the realm of the public.
No matter how well-intentioned such a broadening of the public sector
may be, it is a dangerous move, which would leave individuals at the mercy
of governmental intrusion into their most intimate affairs. Singer, to be
sure, is very vague on the question of who the "we" is that ought to
concern itself with the kinds of relationships we nurture, but if he is serious
that society should take an interest in these matters, the only effective
agency to do so is the state. One need not be an advocate of the nexus of
contracts approach to recognize that corporations are primarily in the
business of making goods and providing services, and that the most we
would want the public sector to do is to ensure that they carry out their
proper task efficiently and fairly. To give corporations a whole set of new
tasks seems to take the problem of corporate governance to a potentially
unmanageable new level.
In short, anyone who argues for shifting the existing boundary will face
problems. Shift the boundary too narrowly, and the boundary does not
shift at all. Shift it too radically, and the boundary completely disappears.
Facing a problem as serious as this, one can be forgiven for concluding
that perhaps the boundary should be left in place.
V. MUDDLING THRoUGH
But does the boundary ever stay in place? We are, let us remember,
talking about changing the ways in which we think about where the line
between public and private should be drawn. But if we focus instead on
where it actually is drawn, we discover that tentativeness and caution are
the appropriate responses. Corporations really are both private and public
simultaneously. They are not states; they carry out economic activities for
a profit, a profit that justifiably is returned to those who take the risk of
investing in what they do. At the same time, corporations are not purely
private individuals. They are institutions that sometimes act as quasi-
governments and, even when they do not, they take actions that affect
every aspect of people's lives, including people who have no formal con-
tractual relationship with them.
The real people who compose the corporate structure recognize both
sides of these relationships. Directors know that they must deliver on
promises to make returns on investments; they rarely need legal or economic
theory to remind them. But they also know, even if economists do not,
that they are tied to the communities in which they exist and have relation-
ships with those who work for them. From their point of view, community
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service or philanthropy make perfect sense. They are realistic responses to
actual situations, not hidden forms of self-interested behavior. Just as they
do not need economists to tell them to make money, they do not need
legislators and reformers to tell them that their institutions affect the lives
of millions.
If directors recognize both private and public obligations, should not
we have a theory that also recognizes both? Advocates for the public side
of the corporation do suggest that directors have private responsibilities.
But advocates for the private side-at least those involved in the legal
aspects of the economic theory of the firm-rarely recognize that directors
also have public responsibilities. The realism inherent in this caution suggests
that the public advocates have the better case.
This case will not neatly consolidate all the principled issues raised by
the corporate governance debate. The public side of the debate presents
suggestions for models rather than models themselves. Some of these sugges-
tions are more sociological than legal. Gunther Teubner, for example, argues
that we should think more about functions than about Constituencies when
considering issues of corporate governance. A knowledge of the factors
necessary for large private organizations to carry out their obligations to
their workers and their communities yields standards that can be used to
establish corporate responsibility.5 9 Philip Selznick makes proposals along
similar lines. Large scale institutions cannot be understood without consid-
eration of the ways in which they succeed or fall in promoting the moral
competence of the agents that compose them. Corporate governance is a
question of "high" politics-of the meaning of community-as much as it
is a question of power. 60
Recent literature emphasizes the need to bring greater recognition of
the public side of corporate activity into the discussion of corporate law.
Professor Millon and Professor Mitchell have proposed two general ap-
proaches. Millon's approach seems to establish new rights for nonshare-
holders, whereas Mitchell's approach seeks common-law solutions by
establishing a new test that would enable potential constituents to challenge
the actions of corporate boards. I will conclude by suggesting that the latter
is more in accord with the realism I have been advocating in this Article.
Millon argues that the statutes passed by states in the wake of the
outcry over LBOs and hostile take-overs cannot be dismissed as not having
established any new rights.61 On the other hand, it is difficult to conclude
that any of the statutes do establish any new rights, for only one of them
makes mandatory the obligation of directors to consider the interests of
nonshareholders, and even that statute is vague. But problems of interpre-
59. Gunther Teubner, Corporate Fiduciary Duties and Their Boundaries, in CORPORATE
GovERNANcE AND DIRECTOR'S LIABrrms: LEAL, EcONOMIC, AND SOCIOLOGIcAL ANALYSES Os
CORPOPRATE SoCIAL RESPONSmILITY 149-77 (Klaus J. Hopt & Gunther Teubner eds., 1985).
60. Pinup SEULZNICK, THE MORAL COMMOONWE.ALTH: SocIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF
CoUmrny 350-54 (1992).
61. Millon, supra note 11, at 256-57.
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tation aside, 62 it is not clear that Millon is actually proposing that non-
shareholders have rights against corporate directors. Voting rights, for
example, have not been established by these statutes. His most exclusive
standard for corporate responsibility reads as follows: "In managing the
company in a manner that pays due regard to profit maximization over the
long-term, management should honor the legitimate expectations of non-
shareholder constituencies if abrogation of existing relationships is necessary
to serve the larger interests of the corporate enterprise as a whole." 63 This
language does not express a right against management. Instead, it establishes
a general duty for management, that, as Millon acknowledges, should be
viewed as more symbolic than actual.
But even if we wanted to change the world in order to give nonshare-
holders rights against directors, could we? Everyone in society is a non-
shareholder of any given corporation except the shareholders, which makes
the term "nonshareholder" fairly close to meaningless. An inability to
define precisely which nonshareholders would have rights against a corpo-
ration dooms a rights-based approach to this issue. Rights are only mean-
ingful when those who exercise them are responsible members of a particular
community. It is clear, for example, that the citizens of a state ought to
exercise rights against a state. Citizens of other states have rights against
their own states, but their rights against a state of which they are not a
citizen are contingent at best. But nonshareholders are often nonshareholders
of every corporation. So are animals and inanimate objects. If there are to
be rights established against directors, we need criteria that determine which
nonshareholders have such rights and why.
Other problems might develop even if we were able to delimit success-
fully those who could claim rights against a corporate board. Rights can
be easily abridged unless they are determined to be fundamental. But how
many fundamental rights can there be? Is the right to a job within any
particular firm equivalent to the right to free speech or the right to an
abortion-both of which have been claimed as fundamental rights? One
might argue that the right to work and to secure a livelihood ought to be
as fundamental as any other right. The right to earn a livelihood, however,
is not a right to a particular job, to be asserted against a particular corporate
board. Rights, moreover, are timeless; corporate activity is not. One does
not have to be a great friend of the sanctity of private profit to recognize
that rights established against a corporation could prevent that corporation
from taking steps necessary to be competitive. It may be possible to establish
a public interest in corporate activity without formally establishing new
rights against corporate directors.
Professor Mitchell proposes to allow the appropriate nonshareholder
constituencies of a corporation to emerge over time in response to litigation.
62. Millon's interpretation of these statues is challenged by Orts, supra note 10, at 80-
84.
63. Millon, supra note 11, at 268.
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Mitchell suggests- that the precedents and procedures necessary to shift the
boundary in significant ways currently exist in corporate law. He proposes
a test in which those injured by the actions of a corporate board, assuming
that those injured had a direct or implied contract with the board, could
bring action in which "the burden would be placed on the board to prove
that its actions were undertaken in pursuit of a legitimate corporate purpose
rather than in the interests of the board itself." 64 If the plaintiffs demonstrate
that the same purpose could have been achieved without the injury-or with
less injury-they could obtain an injunction preventing the board's actions.
Mitchell proposes no clear standard concerning "which constituents
have standing to enforce the duty. ' 65 He suggests settling this issue on a
case-by-case basis. In addition-this is surely a problem of more concern
to a sociologist than to a legal scholar-this approach represents an expan-
sion of litigation and judicial decisionmaking when more informal methods
may be preferable. Still, Mitchell recognizes that public and private are
different realms in which pluralistic standards ought to apply:
In this role, the board serves as an independent mediator of a
variety of legitimate economic and personal interests in the corpo-
ration. This role acknowledges that the modern large corporation
has become a pluralistic entity. It also acknowledges the interde-
pendence of corporate constituent groups and the importance of
each in attaining corporate success. 66
Mitchell thus solves the problem of demarcation between private and public
by deferring the problem to some future time.
This may be the best solution available. If the corporation is both a
private and a public institution, perhaps the only way to develop a reasonable
approach to its activities is to determine which side to emphasize depending
on the particular situation we are confronting. Because I am not a lawyer,
I am not especially bothered that such an approach might produce incon-
sistent results. My own preference would not be for reformed corporate
law, but for questions involving the duality of the corporation to be resolved
nonlegally as often as possible. But we must have law and that law must
cover corporations. What more could we do, under such circumstances,
than to construct a legal system that is as multifaceted-or, if one prefers,
contradictory-as the reality it would presumably regulate?
VI. CONCLUSION
There are obvious problems with the public/private distinction, but that
distinction is here to stay. If we value both sides-if we think that there is
a place for privacy and capitalist initiative, but also a place for larger social
and moral obligations that private actors owe to the public-we will have
64. Mitchell, supra note 47, at 636.
65. Id. at 638.
66. Id. at 640.
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to add either a public dimension to private law or a private dimension to
public law. The question is not whether to embrace one or the other but
how best to find the appropriate mixture.
It is not the case that, historically speaking, we began with private
corporate law and added a public dimension to it. Corporations have had
a public dimension from the very beginning. If anything, the notion of a
private corporation is more artificial-more the product of legislation-than
the notion of a public corporation. If this is true historically, when the
liberal tradition in political theory was grounded in a broad conception of
privacy, it ought to be even more true today, when, at least among those
writing in the tradition of the economic theory of the firm, there is a less
compelling justification for a retreat into privacy. If we are to find a balance
between the public and private roles of corporations, it makes little sense
to start with the private and add a public dimension, because the question
of where the private begins and ends is always somewhat arbitrary.
It makes far more sense, in seeking balance, to begin with the corpo-
ration as a public entity and to develop a conception of the private from
that starting point. A system of legal rules ought to recognize the world
that it regulates. If the world is complex, the legal rules should be complex.
Drawing the line between public and private in a way that is clear, but that
achieves its clarity because it distorts reality, seems less promising a starting
point than one that takes reality into account, even if the result is rules
that, because ambiguous, require common sense and pragmatic reasoning.
I do not suggest what those rules ought to be; it is far beyond my
competence even to introduce such issues. If social science is to make a
contribution to the debate over corporate governance, it can do so by other
means than writing legal codes. The major contribution of social science is
to suggest that the worlds created by human beings rarely can be governed
by rules that seek automatic, preprogrammed responses. The corporation is
one of the most ingenious social institutions ever created. It never governs
itself, but rather is governed. How it ought to be governed is a question
that will always elicit different, even passionately contested, points of view.
The one thing we should expect from those points of view is faithfulness
to reality itself.
1696
